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Abstract
Once New Keynesian (NK) theory (see, e.g., Woodford 2003) is combined
with a standard model of investment (see, e.g., Thomas 2002), the result-
ing framework loses its ability to generate a realistic monetary transmission
mechanism. This is the puzzle uncovered in Reiter et al. (2013). The simple
economic reason behind it is the unrealistically large interest rate elasticity of
investment, as implied by standard investment theory. In order to address this
puzzle we develop a NK model featuring fully exible investment combined
with a nancial friction in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). This
model is used to isolate the quantitative importance of the nancial friction
for the monetary transmission mechanism.
Keywords: Financial Frictions, Sticky Prices.
JEL Classication: E22, E31, E32
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1 Introduction
What explains the short-run e¤ects of monetary policy on real variables of inter-
est? Over the past twenty years dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models featuring nominal rigidities, such as sticky prices or wages combined with
monopolistic competition, have emerged as the standard tool to analyze questions
related to the dynamic consequences of monetary policy changes. Those models are
generally called New Keynesian (NK) theory. Its micro-founded structure makes
this theory in principle usable for policy analysis and, in fact, NK theory is being
used in the academic world as well as in central banks and other policy institutions
to understand a wide range of issues related to monetary policy. However, the nor-
mative results of NK theory are only useful if its positive predictions are relevant
from an empirical point of view. The monetary transmission mechanism is therefore
generally viewed as being the hallmark of NK theory (see, e.g., Woodford 2003, p.
6, and Galí 2015, p. 1).
It is well understood by now that smoothness in aggregate capital accumulation
is necessary to obtain a reasonable monetary transmission mechanism in the context
of NK models.1 This has motivated Christiano et al. (2005) and Woodford (2005)
to introduce adjustment costs into the investment block of the NK framework, and
most of the related literature has followed their lead.2 But the existence of those
adjustment costs makes NK models inconsistent with the observed lumpiness in
plant-level investment.3 Motivated by this problem our work in Reiter et al. (2013)
uses standard investment theory (see, e.g., Thomas 2002) to make an otherwise con-
ventional NK DSGE model consistent with the lumpy nature of capital adjustment
at the micro level. In the context of the resulting framework the following puzzle
emerges. Monetary shocks are shown to have dynamic consequences whose strength
and persistence are out of line with the data. Specically, the impact responses of
investment and output to a change in the nominal interest rate become very large
and the dynamic consequences of that shock are only short-lived.4 In a nutshell, the
1It is therefore even common in the NK literature to abstract from capital accumulation (see,
e.g., Galí 2015, among many others).
2Specically, Christiano et al. (2005) assume a convex investment adjustment cost, whereas
Woodford (2005) postulates a convex capital adjustment cost.
3That lumpiness is reported by, e.g., Doms and Dunne (1998), Thomas (2002) and Khan and
Thomas (2008). In the context of our theory there is no distinction between a plant and a rm
and we therefore use those terms interchangeably.
4Given the large size of the literature on the monetary transmision mechanism of might wonder
why the puzzle presented in Reiter et al. (2013) has not been uncovered before. The simple reason
is that the general equilibrium consequences of multiple (S,s) decisions at the micro level can not
easily be computed. In Reiter et al. (2013) we have relied on the method developed in Reiter
(2009, 2010) to bring this about.
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reason behind the main result in Reiter et al. (2013) is that non-convex adjustment
costs which are routinely assumed in the investment literature do not rationalize a
realistic interest rate sensitivity of investment. The (S,s) nature of investment deci-
sions is crucial to understand this result. In response to an expansionary monetary
policy shock rms choose to undertake some of the investment activity that they
would have otherwise done later. This mechanism, which is often called an extensive
margin e¤ect (see, e.g., Caballero and Engel 2007), explains the unrealistically large
interest rate elasticity of investment in Reiter et al. (2013).
The motivation for the present paper originates in this puzzle. In fact, we assess
the quantitative importance of a simple economic mechanism to address it. More
concretely, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) show that a nancial friction in the process
of capital production might act as a smoothing device. In order to isolate the
role of this mechanism we formulate a NK model featuring otherwise fully exible
investment combined with a nancial friction in their spirit.5 That friction can,
in principle, perfectly coexist with lumpiness in plant-level investment. This is
important because many other frictions make the model inconsistent with lumpy
investment, once they have a size that gives rise to a realistic monetary transmission
mechanism.6 It is therefore interesting that a plausible calibration of the nancial
friction under consideration makes our model go a long way towards an empirically
relevant monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 presents the dynamic analysis and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model integrates a nancial friction in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model of the monetary transmission
mechanism. Fig. 1 summarizes the model structure.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Since the details of the model features have been discussed elsewhere (see, Carl-
strom and Fuerst 1997 for a discussion of the nancial friction and, e.g., Woodford
2003 or Galí 2015 for textbook treatments of the New Keynesian elements) we turn
5Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) also propose a monetray version of their (1997) RBC model. But
this involves a cash-in-advance constraint, whereas we consider a standard cashless NK economy.
6For instance, Reiter at al. (2013) show that a convex capital adjustment cost at the rm level
combined with a (S,s) restriction on investment gives rise to a realistic monetary transmission
mechanism only to the extent that the size of the convex cost is large enough to eliminate a
plausible degree of lumpiness in investment.
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directly to the implied set of equilibrium conditions. There is a continuum of rms
and each of them is the monopolistically competitive producer of a di¤erentiated
good. Firms hire labor, rent capital from households and entrepreneurs and set
prices in a staggered fashion à la Calvo (1983). Each rm has access to the follow-
ing production function using capital, householdslabor and entrepreneurial labor
as inputs
Yt = F (Kt; (1  )Lt; ) ; (1)
where Yt is output of its di¤erentiated consumption good. Our notation reects
the assumptions that there is a measure (1  ) of households and a measure 
of entrepreneurs. Moreover households labor supply, Lt, is elastic, whereas each
entrepreneur supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The capital stock used in time
t production is denoted by Kt.
Cost minimization on the part of rms implies the following set of factor prices
rt =
FK (Kt; (1  )Lt; )
Mt
; (2)
wt =
FH (Kt; (1  )Lt; )
Mt
; (3)
xt =
FHe (Kt; (1  )Lt; )
Mt
; (4)
where rt, wt and xt denote, respectively, the real rental rate for capital, the real
wage and the real wage for entrepreneurial labor. They are given by the associated
marginal products combined with the average price markup, Mt.
Householdslabor supply equation reads
 = wtU
0
(Ct) ; (5)
where  is a parameter, reecting our assumption of a linear disutiliy associated with
supplying labor. As usual, U
0
(Ct) indicates the marginal utility of consumption
and Ct is the households time t consumption level of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate.
Households decide how much of their labor and capital income to consume in the
same period, and how much to save by investing in capital accumulation. If a
household wishes to purchase capital, it must fund entrepreneurial projects, and
these projects are subject to agency problems. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
households arrange their lending through a capital mutual fund (CMF). For each
unit of investment that a household wishes to purchase, it gives qt consumption
goods to the CMF. The additional capital resulting from time t investment becomes
productive with a one-period delay and the Euler equation characterizing the optimal
4
consumption/savings decision therefore takes the following standard form
qtU
0
(Ct) = Et
n
U
0
(Ct+1) [qt+1 (1  ) + rt+1]
o
; (6)
where parameter  is the discount factor for utility and parameter  is the rate of
depreciation.
The CMF uses the resources obtained from households to provide loans to an
innite number of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs get access to the ag-
gregate consumption good through the CMF in exchange for the promise to repay
with interest in terms of the capital good they produce. More concretely, an entre-
preneur with net worth n who borrows (i  n) consumption goods agrees to repay 
1 + rk

(i  n) capital goods to the lender. Entrepreneurs place their entire net
worth as well as the borrowed consumption goods into their capital-creation tech-
nology. The latter is assumed to be stochastic. It contemporaneously transforms i
consumption goods into !i units of capital. The random variable ! is i.i.d. across
time and entrepreneurs. Agency issues emerge by assuming that ! is privately ob-
served by the entrepreneur. Others can observe ! only at a monitoring cost of i
units of capital. This information asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem be-
cause, without monitoring, the entrepreneur might not wish to tell the true value
of !. However, the contract considered in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) incentivizes
entrepreneurs to always truthfully report the ! realization. This contract takes a
simple form. If an entrepreneur reneges on the promise to repay the specied quan-
tity of capital goods, monitoring occurs with probability one.7 Entrepreneurs also
work for rms and generate an associated labor income which prevents them from
having a zero level of net worth. A related point is that entrepreneurs do not accu-
mulate net worth to the point that the agency problem disappears. In Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) that is made sure by assuming that entrepreneurs discount the future
more heavily than do households. In our context, this assumption would also guar-
antee that the above mentioned contracting problem between entrepreneurs and the
CMF is well-dened at each point in time. However, risk neutrality combined with
an interior solution implies an innite intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
thus gives rise to extreme uctuations in entrepreneurial consumption and highly
volatile investment dynamics in the equilibrium of our model. We will come back to
this later. In order to avoid this problem, we adopt instead a classical assumption
that has been popularized by Bernanke et al. (1999). Specically, entrepreneurs are
assumed to consume a constant fraction out of their net worth nt. Entrepreneurial
consumption, Ce;t, therefore takes the following form
7See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for a discussion of the optimality of that contract.
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Ce;t = cent; (7)
with ce denoting the fraction of net worth that entrepreneurs consume in the current
period. To raise internal funds entrepreneurs supply labor and rent out capital to
rms. They sell the remaining undepreciated capital to the CMF for consumption
goods (the input used in their production technology). In the aggregate, entrepre-
neursbudget constraint takes the following form
nt = xt +
Zt [qt (1  ) + rt]

; (8)
where Zt denotes the aggregate entrepreneurial capital stock. The latter evolves
according to a law of motion of the form
Zt = nt 1
roit 1
qt 1
  Ce;t 1
qt 1
; (9)
with roit measuring an entrepreneurs return on investment. The latter takes into
account that net worth is leveraged into an investment project. Entrepreneurs keep
a fraction of the resulting capital, and capital is priced at qt. Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) show that roit is determined by
roit =
qtf (!t; )
1  qtg (!t; ) ; (10)
with function f (!t; ) measuring the fraction of the expected net capital output
received by an entrepreneur. Its rst argument is the critical value for idiosyncratic
productivity, !t: a project gets monitored, if an entrepreneur reports an idiosyn-
cratic productivity level below that value. Its second argument is the standard
deviation of the distribution of entrepreneursidiosyncratic technology. Similarly,
function g (!t; ) measures the fraction of the expected net capital output received
by the CMF. The aggregate law of motion of the capital stock is of the form
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It [1   (!t; d; )] ; (11)
where the second term reects the assumption that capital is produced by entre-
preneurs and part of that production is lost due to agency costs. As it turns out,
that loss depends on the (linear) monitoring cost , the distribution of entrepre-
neurss idiosyncratic technology (assumed to be normal with mean d and standard
deviation ) as well as on the critical value for idiosyncratic productivity, !t. Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997) show how this critical value is obtained from two rst-order
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conditions implied by the agency problem. They read
qt =
1
1   (!t; d; )+  (!t; d; ) f(!t;)f!(!t;)
; (12)
It =
nt
1  qtg (!t; ) : (13)
In stating the last two equations we have used the notation  (!t; d; ) for the
density of entrepreneursidiosyncratic technology evaluated at the critical value !t,
and f! (!t; ) is meant to indicate the derivative of function f with respect to its
rst argument. The aggregate goods market clearing condition is of the form
Yt = (1  )Ct + Ce;t + It: (14)
As it is usual in the new Keynesian literature, gross ination t  PtPt 1 (with
Pt denoting the time t price of the aggregate consumption good) is obtained from
averaging optimal pricing decisions in a Calvo environment via the price index. The
latter implies
t =

p + (1  p) (pt )1 "
 1
1 " ; (15)
with p denoting the Calvo parameter, i.e., the probability according to which a
rm is not allowed to change price in a given period. Parameter " measures the
elasticity of substitution between the di¤erentiated consumption goods in our econ-
omy. Finally, we have used the notation pt  P

t
Pt 1
for the optimal newly set price,
P t , that is chosen by all time t price-setters in our model, relative to the price of
the consumption good one period earlier. The stochastic discount factor, Qt;t+1, for
nominal random prots is of the form
Qt;t+1  U
0
(Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)
Pt
Pt+1
: (16)
Let us also notice that up to a rst-order approximation our model implies a standard
inverse relationship between the real marginal cost, rt , and the average price markup
rt =
1
Mt
: (17)
The rst-order condition for price-setting takes the standard form for a constant
returns technology (see, e.g., Galí 2015, p. 56)
1X
k=0
Et

Qt;t+kYt+kjt (1=Pt+k)
 
P t   pnt+k
	
= 0; (18)
with nt indicating the time t nominal marginal cost, and Yt+kjt denoting output in
period t + k for a rm that last reset its price in period t. Parameter p  "
" 1 is
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the desired frictionless price markup. To close the model we assume a Taylor-type
rule for the conduct of monetary policy
Rt = (Rt 1)
r
"



t

 Yt
Y
y#1 r
eer;t : (19)
The shock, er;t, is i:i:d: with zero mean and monetary policy shocks are assumed
to be the only source of aggregate uncertainty. Parameters  and y indicate the
long-run responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in current ination
and output,8 respectively, and parameter r measures interest rate smoothing.
3 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
Our model will be used to quantify the e¤ects of a monetary policy shock. A baseline
calibration of that model is presented next.
3.1 Baseline Calibration
The model period is a quarter. The discount factor, , is set to 0:99, which implies an
annualized steady state real interest rate of about 4 percent. Annualized steady state
ination is assumed to be two percent. As to the interest rate rule coe¢ cients, it is
assumed  = 1:5; y = 0:5=4 and r = 0:7. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution
between the di¤erentiated goods, ", is set to 7. We also assume p = 0:75 implying
an average expected life-time of a price of 4 quarters. Those parameter values are
consistent with the corresponding choices in Reiter et al. (2013). Other parameter
values are justied in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). In particular, the depreciation
rate, , is set to 0:02. The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-
Douglas form with capital-share parameter, K = 0:36, labor-share, H = 0:6399,
and entrepreneurial labor-share, He = 0:001. The fraction of entrepreneurs, , is set
to 0:003. Our baseline choice for the bankruptcy cost parameter, , is 0:25, a value in
what Carlstrom and Fuerst describe as the plausible range, i.e., between 0:2 and 0:36.
Parameters  and ce are treated as unobservable. They are chosen to match two
empirical values that are also justied in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). In particular,
we match a quarterly bankruptcy rate of 0:974 as well as an annual risk premium
of 187 basis points. In the context of our model, the bankruptcy rate is given by
 (!t; d; ) and the quarterly risk premium is q
 
1 + rk
   1. Finally, parameter
8Usually, the output gap, i.e., the ratio between equilibrium output and natural output (dened
as the equilibrium output under exible prices) enters the specication of monetary policy. Notice,
however, that natural output does not change in response to a monetary disturbance.
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 is chosen to ensure that households spend one third of their time working. We
therefore have  = 0:3783, ce = 0:064 and  = 1:5672.
3.2 Baseline Analysis
We analyze the dynamic consequences of a 100 basis point decrease in the annualized
nominal interest rate. The rate of ination as well as the real interest rate are also
annualized. All other variables are measured as the respective log deviation of the
original variable from its steady state value. Fig. 2 illustrates the outcome under the
baseline calibration. Monetary policy shocks are shown to lead to strong and persis-
tent dynamic responses of the variables under consideration. How do they compare
to those estimated using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methods?9 The
estimates reported by Christiano et al. (2005) indicate that the maximum output
response to an identied monetary policy shock is about 0:5 percent (with 95 per-
cent condence interval around this point estimate of about  0:2). After that,
output is estimated to take about one and a half years to revert to its original level.
Christiano et al. (2005) also estimate a maximum investment response of about one
percent (with 95 percent condence interval around this point estimate of about
 0:5). The estimated maximum consumption response is roughly 0:2 percent (with
95 percent condence interval around this point estimate of about  0:1) while the
estimated maximum ination response of roughly 0:2 percent (with 95 percent con-
dence interval around this point estimate of about  0:15). Finally, the nominal
interest rate takes about two quarters to return half-way to its preshock level.
[Figure 2 about here]
By and large, the theoretical impulse responses shown in Fig. 2 are similar to
the empirical evidence on the dynamic consequences of monetary policy shocks. An
exception is investment. In fact, the (about) three percent impact response to the
shock is out of line with the point estimate of one percent for the maximum response
of that variable. In a way that is consistent with the large size of the investment
response, the impact responses of the remaining real quantities also turn out to be
somewhat to the high part of the empirically plausible range. On the positive side
we can notice, however, that the impact responses of the nominal variables are better
in line with corresponding point estimates of the maximum responses. We also nd
that the dynamic consequences of the shock are reasonably persistent. What is the
relevance of this result, and what is the economic mechanism at work? Woodford
9It is precisely that comparision which is routinely used by proponents of NK theory to justify
the quantitative relevance of this framework. See, e.g., the discussion in Galí (2015), p.68 in the
context of a model featuring a constant capital stock at the rm level.
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(2005) shows that a NK model featuring a convex capital adjustment cost at the
rm level gives rise to a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism.
On the other hand, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) show that for a constant level of
net worth the agency-cost model implies a smoothing mechanism that is analogous
to the one implied by a convex capital adjustment cost. As it turns out, in the
context of our model, that smoothing mechanism is remarkably strong. In order to
substantiate the latter statement, we shut down the nancial friction by setting the
bankruptcy cost, , to a very small value. Investment is therefore fully exible in
this case and the implied dynamic responses of the variables under consideration
to the monetary policy chock are illustrated in Fig. 3. Let us also notice that
parameters , ce and  are adjusted in such a way that the same objects as in our
baseline calibration are still targeted.
[Figure 3 about here]
The results shown in Fig. 3 help explain the relevance of our baseline results. In
fact, the impulse responses document the well known problem that exible invest-
ment gives rise to counterfactual impulse responses to monetary policy shocks. This
is exactly the reason why Christiano et al. (2005) and Woodford (2005) had intro-
duced adjustment costs into the investment block of the NK framework. In their
work there is, however, no empirical discipline imposed on the size of the adjustment
cost, apart from a desire to parametrize the postulated cost in a way that gives rise
to a realistic monetary transmission mechanism. This is true for both the invest-
ment adjustment cost in Christiano et al. (2005), as well as for the convex capital
adjustment cost in Woodford (2005). On the contrary, the size of the nancial fric-
tion in our model is disciplined by data on interest rate spreads, bankruptcy rates
and bankruptcy costs, as explained in section 3:1. It is therefore remarkable that
a nancial friction of a plausible size implies a strong smoothing mechanism that
makes our baseline results go a long way towards a realistic monetary transmission
mechanism. Let us also inspect some quantitative aspects of Fig. 3. The impact
investment response to the monetary policy shock turns out to be almost twenty
percent, i.e., twenty times larger than the corresponding maximum point estimate
reported by Christiano et al. (2005). In the NK lumpy investment model proposed
in Reiter (2013) we found a counterfactual monetary transmission mechanism with
an impact investment response of about eight percent.10 Compared with the twenty
percent impact response implied by the exible capital model we nd that a standard
(S,s) modelling of lumpy investment does imply a (modest) smoothing mechanism.11
10This is for the case of Calvo pricing combined with (S,s) investment.
11Strictly speaking, the irrelevance result in Thomas (2002) and Kahn and Thomas (2008) does
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This points to the possibility that a standard modelling of lumpy investment could
overcome the remaining problem with a somewhat too exible investment under our
baseline calibration. Below we inspect the robustness of our results by varying the
form of the nancial friction in various ways. Discussing the di¤erences with respect
to our baseline allows us to further inspect the economic mechanisms at work.
3.3 Robustness Analysis
The rst robustness analysis regards the size of the nancial friction.12 More con-
cretely, we now consider values for the bankruptcy cost, , that are to the high
and to the low part of the empirically relevant range. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Each line in the gure is associated with one value of  2 f0:2, 0:25, 0:36g, and
parameters , ce and  are adjusted in such a way that the same objects as in our
baseline calibration are still targeted.
[Figure 4 about here]
Fig. 4 brings out a clear message. Our baseline results are robust with respect to
reasonable variations in the size of the nancial friction. A related question regards
the quantitative importance of our baseline choice for the annual risk premium in
the steady state. This is addressed in Fig. 5.
[Figure 5 about here]
The investment response to the shock becomes smaller if the size of the nancial
friction, as measured by the risk premium, is increased. However, even in the case of
a three percent annual risk premium the associated impact responses to the mone-
tary policy shock remain somewhat counterfactual. The main problem is once again
seen to be the large exibility in investment. Finally, we examine the original mod-
elling of the nancial friction in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). In order to guarantee
that the above mentioned contracting problem between entrepreneurs and the CMF
is well-dened at each point in time, one has to make sure that entrepreneurs do not
accumulate net worth to the point that this problem simply disappears. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) achieve this by assuming that entrepreneurs discount the future
therefore not go through in the context of a NK model. In fact, those authors had established an
equivalence in the equilibrium determination of aggregate quantities between a (S,s) modelling of
lumpy investment and a frictionless RBC model.
12A robustness analysis with respect to the monetary policy parameters just plays out in ways
that are similar to the corresponding outcomes in standard NK models. The same is true for
variations of the price stickiness parameter. Let us also notice that the baseline results turn out
to be robust with respect to our choice of steady state ination. Needless to say, those results are
available upon request.
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more heavily than do households. The entrepreneurs Euler equation is therefore of
the form
qt = Et f[qt+1 (1  ) + rt+1] roit+1g ; (20)
where parameter  reects the assumption that entrepreneurs discount the future
more heavily than households. We set this parameter to 0:947. Otherwise, all para-
meters and steady state values are the same as in our baseline. The last equation also
reects that entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral. The associated monetary
transmission mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 6.
[Figure 6 about here]
Compared with the baseline, the theoretical impulse responses, as implied by
the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) assumption on entrepreneurial consumption, are
further away from their empirical counterpart. In fact, the maximum investment
response to the shock is now more than four percent, compared with about three
percent in the baseline, and the one percent maximum response in the data. The
economic reason is the large extent to which risk-neutral entrepreneurs engage in
intertemporal consumption substitution implying highly volatile equilibrium invest-
ment dynamics. This is seen in Fig. 6. An expansionary monetary policy shock
gives rise to an increase in aggregate demand in the economy. Firms are therefore
incentivized to produce more and consequently increase their demand for capital
and labor. The persistent increase in the demand for capital leads to an increase
in its price. The latter results in an increased return on investment which gives
entrepreneurs the incentive to reduce their consumption. Starting one period after
the monetary policy shock entrepreneurs increase their consumption again. The
reason is that they can enjoy an increased net worth by that time, and the relative
attractiveness of investing (as opposed to consuming) declines, as the dynamic con-
sequences of the monetary policy shock start fading out. Overall, Fig. 6 conveys a
clear message. The assumed form of the nancial friction matters for the implied
monetary transmission mechanism, and this in itself makes it highly desirable to
further improve the micro-foundations of quantitative macroeconomic models along
that dimension.
4 Conclusion
Once New Keynesian (NK) theory (see, e.g., Woodford 2003) is combined with
a standard model of investment (see, e.g., Thomas 2002), the resulting framework
loses its ability to generate a realistic monetary transmission mechanism. This is the
12
puzzle uncovered in Reiter et al. (2013). The simple economic reason behind it is the
high degree of exibility in capital accumulation, as implied by standard investment
theory. We therefore ask how to reconcile exibility in capital accumulation with a
quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism. In order to address this
question, we develop a NK model featuring fully exible investment combined with
a nancial friction in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). This simple model
is shown to go a long way towards a realistic monetary transmission mechanism.
It can therefore be expected that in the presence of an empirically plausible
nancial friction of the type considered in this paper, standard investment theory can
be integrated into an empirically relevant NK model of the monetary transmission
mechanism. This is the next natural step in this agenda. The interest is twofold.
First, it is an open question whether standard normative lessons from NK theory
hold up in the presence of lumpy investment. The reason is that lumpy investment is
a potential source of signicant heterogeneity across rms. Hence, it might play an
important role in shaping the optimal monetary policy response to shocks, the same
way staggered prices generate ine¢ cient price dispersion and thus provide a motive
for ination stabilization. Sveen and Weinke (2016) make some progress on that
front, however in the context of a simple Calvo (1983) style model of investment à la
Sveen and Weinke (2007). Second, in order to increase the empirical relevance of the
monetary transmission mechanism with respect to standard textbook treatments a
rich set of additional features has been proposed. Prominent among them is an
investment adjustment cost à la Christiano et al. (2005). But the existence of this
adjustment cost makes NKmodels inconsistent with the observed lumpiness in plant-
level investment. It is therefore an open question how to match the quantitative
features of estimated impulse responses to a monetary policy shock without relying
on assumptions that eliminate micro-level lumpiness in investment.
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Fig. 1. A Birds View on the Model.
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Fig. 2. Dynamic Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock: Baseline.
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Fig. 3. Baseline vs. Flexible Capital.
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Fig. 4. Baseline vs. Alternative Bancruptcy Costs.
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Fig. 5. Baseline vs. Alternative Risk Premia.
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Fig. 6. Baseline vs. Carlstrom Fuerst Ass. on Entrepreneurial Consumption.
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